Проблемы безопасности и предотвращения радиационных аварий в Венгрии
Development of safety policy for nuclear accident preparedness in Hungary
- 1 Академия ГПС МЧС Росиии
- 2 ООО «Атомикс» ЗАО Пакшская АЭС Венгерского предприятия по снабжению электроэнергией
- 3 Институт чрезвычайных ситуаций факультета правоохранительных наук Национального университета государственной службы Венгрии
Авторы доклада анализируют накопленный опыт радиационных аварий и катастроф и на основании этого рассматривают направления, которые могут послужить укреплению радиационной безопасности в Венгрии. Развитие новых технологий позволяет разработать принципы, которые помогут предотвратить крупные аварии.
Based on the experience of nuclear incidents and the emergence of new nuclear safety technologies, guidelines for the management of nuclear accidents need to be continuously developed. In the this work, the authors present the directions of the development of nuclear accident preparedness safety policies in Hungary.
Introduction
The safety policy of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) fulfills the highest level of safety planning policies. In doing so, the objective is to develop protection systems and procedures that include mobile solutions in addition to multi-level redundant systems, in order to minimize damage to human life, property and the environment. Furthermore reduce the irreversible damage that has occurred.
The design and construction will comply with international and domestic legislations as well as nuclear directives. They will do this by using all the experience with existing nuclear facilities to ensure safety more. If we take into account the 3+ generation nuclear power plants located on different continents, the requirements and experience used there are definitely the basis for the industrial safety developments in Hungary. Their relevance can be used in the construction of new nuclear facilities.
Examination of safety policies for the management
of severe nuclear accidents
Targeted intervention procedures have been developed to deal with severe accidents. They intend to initiate system management processes depending on the current situation. The order of these implementation procedures is greatly influenced by the current operating condition and the potential hazards that may result. The primary implementation is performed by automatic safety systems.
However in the event of any system component inoperability or malfunctions, it is the responsibility of the system operators to perform situation-oriented manual intervention. The state-dependent operator's procedure instructions of the NPP, which are important for system management, have been developed primarily to avoid zone damage. If these interventions are unsuccessful, the system instructions can no longer be effectively applied to actual or former zone damage accidents. It is because they do not include operations designed to maintain the integrity of the physical barriers to fulfill their basic purpose of preventing the release of radioactive materials. As soon as significant fuel-cover damage and zone geometry loss occurs, maintaining a stable state of the hermetic space becomes a primary goal, thereby emissions still can be controlled. In light of this, in some major accident situations, preserving the safety of the hermetic space or preventing the escape of fission products may take precedence over zone cooling. [1]
In the case of severe accidents, the optimal management of the situation requires units with a professional experience. They should be able to meet the relevant requirements, because combined problem solving requires the performance of multi-level protection tasks. The management of serious accidents is a complex, special task. The management and objective implementation which is performed by a predetermined structural and department divided organization is temporarily formed to deal with the situation. In the event of a major disruption, an organization must be set up and operated according to the pre-defined operational management structure. It is in charge until the situation requires the application of the SAM Guidelines or a stable operating condition is established.
If necessary, the organization management coordinates the work from a protected base of operations, from which it has a continuous view on the status of the events and the performed tasks. The missions of the management organization and their sequence, are an integrated part of the SAM guidelines. They are implementation instructions fitted in a specific hierarchical regulatory system. [2]
Nuclear accident management always means the practical implementation of planned processes, of which the implementation is an integral part of the most thorough prevention possible. Preventive action and accident management are different in terms of specific measures and enforcement tasks. If prevention is not enough and any dangerous situation arises where specific interventions are needed, then the purpose of the accident management will become a different priority. In a case like this the accident management’s aim is to prevent damage and core melting by all possible methods which can reduce even the occurrence of major accidents beyond planning. The relationship between preventive and consequence mitigation measures is summarized in the prevention and accident management table of the Severe accident management systems and procedures article.
Table 1
Accident Management
Event | Within Design Basis | Beyond Design Basis | ||
Goal | Zone-melting prohibition, activity retention | Reducing the consequences of zone-melting | ||
Systems | Application of operational and safety systems within design limits | Usage of all available systems within their design | ||
Form of accident management | Prevention | Consequence reduction | ||
Instruction/manual | Optimal recovery | Function restoration instructions | Severe accident manuals | |
Source: Severe Accident Management Guidelines 6
The complex accident management procedures for critical damage and zone-melting contain guidelines unlike the mandatory actions of the sorted preventive procedures. That’s the reason why during the specific steps of the manual, the entire accident management process must be interpreted and analyzed. Then, depending on its current state, a decision must be made to implement the steps of the comprehensive processes to properly manage the accident situation. The processes are discussed in detail in the severe accident management guidelines section of the article. [2]
Definition of main requirements for the development
of severe-accident management
One of the most basic aspects of the efficiency and development in the Severe accident management is the comprehensive knowledge of preparedness and prior professional science. In addition to the technological and safety parameters of NPPs, an accurate knowledge of the existing equipment and the possibilities of intervention in the necessary situation can provide the basis on which nuclear safety can be built. The level of detail and the route through which the available information of an occurred situation reaches the security staff is crucial. The flow of information in an emergency situation must have a real-time communication channel, whose availability and content cannot be limited by any external or technical circumstances. This means that the operating management team and the technological control systems must be in accordance with the current status of information and must use real time communication channels.
The personnel performing tasks under the authority of the organization responsible for the Severe Accident Management of an NPP are obliged to meet the requirements not only in terms of their preparedness, but also in terms in their quantitative factor. With regard to the Paks NPP, this is also important because another NPP, with similar operating principle but different generation classification, is under construction in its immediate vicinity. That being the case, in addition to existing designs, the dangers of a parallel operating NPP must also be taken into account. Safety bases should also be designed for the occurrence of another serious accident developing in parallel or arising from an existing nuclear accident. It means that the resources deployed for one incident cannot discharge the global nuclear resources in such an extent that they would not cope with a corresponding event. [3]
Conclusion
The basis of the developments in Hungary is that the safety requirements of the two parallel operating NPPs should be no less than sufficient. To do this, it must be taken into account that the technological parameters of the new power plant involve the development of different emergency response procedures. The essence of this development is that the existing requirements for different generations of NPPs must agree with the existing regulators. By that they can specify and determine the parameters of the technological solutions of the new NPP and therefore guarantee the safe operation. Considering the severe-accident management, this means that, in addition to the compliance with the existing requirements, it will be necessary to redesign accident management protocols. By doing so the necessary procedures could be implemented effectively for parallel NPPs.
References
1. National Report "Targeted safety review of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant". Budapest: National Atomic Energy Agency, 2011.
2. Severe Accident Management Systems, Operation of the primary circuit systems, MVM Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt, Verziószám: 1.0, 2018.
3. Antal Zoltán, Kátai-Urbán Lajos, Vass Gyula. Nukleáris biztonsági irányelvek magyarországi megvalósulása // Védelem tudomány: katasztrófavédelmi online tudományos folyóirat. 4 : 2. 2019. pp. 122-145.